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Abstract: Analyses that gauge the relationship of partisanship to economic outcomes 
nearly always focus on the level of partisanship, and changes to it, at a time concurrent to 
the outcomes. However, partisanship at the time an institution was established may 
correspond more strongly to modern economic outcomes than contemporary partisanship 
measures. To test this argument, I develop a measure of partisanship at the time that 
modern capitalist institutions were created. Tests reveal that this measure correlates more 
strongly to many modern economic outcomes than more contemporary measures of 
partisanship, suggesting that other economic outcomes may be usefully reexamined in 
light of the partisanship that existed when the initial institutional bargains were struck.
* Assistant Professor, S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies, Nanyang 
Technological University, Singapore
2Analyses that gauge the relationship of partisanship to economic outcomes nearly always 
focus on the level of partisanship, and changes to it, at a time concurrent to the outcomes. 
However, this overlooks the impact of the original design of an institution which can
delimit the range of possible outcomes. In this regard, government partisanship at the 
time an institution was established may correspond more strongly to modern economic 
outcomes than contemporary measures of partisanship. Additionally, complementarities 
with other institutions (which may have been created during the same moment of 
government partisanship) would likewise constrain the range of economic outcomes, thus 
magnifying the influence of the initial partisanship levels on contemporary outcomes
(Hall and Soskice, 2001).
To test this argument, I create a partisanship measure that corresponds, roughly, 
to the time that modern capitalist institutions were created across wealthy democracies. I
then test this partisanship measure on key institutions that exhibit strong 
complementarities to other institutions, and which exhibit distinctive qualities that 
differentiate liberal market economies from coordinated market economies. The 
robustness of the results suggests that examination of other economic outcomes that 
correspond to contemporary partisanship measures may be usefully reexamined in light 
of the partisanship that existed when the initial institutional bargains were struck.
In the next section - section two - I identify the time period that modern capitalist 
institutions were created among wealthy democracies. I then identify those economic 
institutions that typify countries’ general economic organization and which tend to 
strongly complement other institutions in the broader political economy. In the fourth 
3section, I discuss the construction of the partisanship measure before turning to statistical 
tests in section five. Section six concludes. 
II) When Were Modern Capitalist Institutions Created?
Among wealthy democracies, industrialization during the nineteenth and early twentieth 
centuries altered the existing agrarian-based economy and created a new, ‘modern’ form 
of capitalism. Following World War I, labor’s political influence surged across many 
European countries, leading to new bargains being struck with regard to the structure of 
the new institutions of capitalism, which became entrenched over time. But for some 
countries, the depression and World War II disrupted the structure of their political and 
economic institutions, and created the opportunity for a new set of institutional bargains 
after the war ended. Table 1 lists the dates of the last major constitutional change for the 
15 countries examined here, illustrating that five countries in the sample significantly 
altered their institutions after WWII: France, Germany, Japan, Austria, and Italy.i
4Table 1: Most Recent Year of Major Constitutional Change
Year of last major 
change of 
constitution
AUS 1901
AUT 1945
BEL 1831
CAN 1867
DEN 1901
FRA 1946
GER 1949
ITA 1948
JAP 1946
NET 1848
NOR 1814
SWE 1866
SWI 1874
UK NA
USA 1787
Changes to the structure of the constitution after WWII generally correspond to 
changes in the countries’ economic institutions. For example, France nationalized its 
major commercial banks and many of its largest companies after the war, along with 
implementing more centralized state control over the general economy, in contrast to its 
laissez-faire economy before WWII (Alhadeff, 1968). Sweeping economic reforms that 
were favorable to labor were likewise implemented in Austria and Italy. The influence of 
labor in Germany was slightly muted because of American and British influence, 
nevertheless, new institutional rules were established following the war that firmly 
entrenched labor’s role in the organization of the political economy (e.g., corporate 
governance reforms; Streeck and Yamamura, 2001).ii Allied influence also muted labor’s 
influence in Japan, yet here too rules were implemented that granted more power to labor, 
5as with its corporate governance reforms and the use of lifetime employment policies 
(Gilson and Roe, 1999). 
Accordingly, we should look at bargains struck in the early twentieth century for 
ten of these countries – when many of the rules governing their modern capitalist 
institutions were established – and immediately after WWII for the other five. Of course, 
the specific dates will differ for each country, but by constraining the sample to these 
wealthy countries, the variation in the timing of when their modern capitalist institutions 
were established is minimized.
III) Which Economic Institutions?
Those economic institutions which exhibit strong complementarities to other institutions 
offer the broadest implications for understanding the influence of initial bargains on 
contemporary outcomes. In this regard, I consider the degree of coordination among 
institutions with an index developed by Hall and Gingerich (2004). The institutions used 
to calculate the coordination index include shareholder power, dispersion of control, size 
of stock market, level of wage coordination, degree of wage coordination, and labor 
turnover. High levels of coordination are associated with a more coordinated market 
economy.
Additionally, I consider specific economic institutions that correspond to the 
economy’s general reliance on market versus non-market mechanisms, such as the size of 
equities markets relative to banks (which is particularly useful because data are available 
across the twentieth century), the diffusion of corporate ownership, and the extent of 
government intervention. Hall and Soskice (2001), for example, use stock market 
6capitalization relative to GDP as a general indicator for a nation’s reliance on arm’s-
length interactions relative to relationship-based interactions. This is a good measure, but 
it needs to be treated with caution. Stock markets are known for occasional bubbles and 
busts, making it a potentially unreliable measure if examining only one point in time.iii In 
the long-run (over decades), stock markets tend to settle around an equilibrium price level 
(e.g., 10% increase per annum for the NYSE), making it preferable to measure a 
country’s reliance on stock markets across long periods of time to gauge a country’s 
overall reliance on markets. 
At the same time, looking exclusively at stock markets can be problematic since a 
nation with a low stock market capitalization does not necessarily mean low non-market 
(banking) activity - both could be low. Thus, it would be preferable to have a measure for 
a nation’s reliance on banks as well, such as bank loans relative to GDP, or bank deposits 
relative to GDP (from which bank loans are derived). To avoid this problem, we can take 
the ratio of the two - stock market capitalization/bank deposits - to get a more balanced
assessment of a country's overall reliance on arm’s-length vs. relationship-based forms of 
economic activity.iv
Table 2 shows the average size of stock markets during the pre- and post-World 
War II periods across countries, revealing that there have been considerable changes 
between these two periods. The ordering of countries in the postwar period, however, 
raises some questions with regard to the utility of the stock market capitalization measure 
as an indicator for the LME-CME orientation of a country since some countries seem out 
of place, such as Switzerland (being too LME), and the USA (being too CME) relative to 
conventional assessments of their financial, and capitalist, systems. 
7Table 2: Stock Market Capitalization to GDP, 
Pre-WWII and Post-WWII
a avg. 1913-1929v
 b avg. 1950-1990
Data Source: Rajan and Zingales (2003).
These results suggest that it may be preferable to account for the reliance on banking. 
Table 3 illustrates the ratio of stock market capitalization to bank deposits.vi Compared to 
the stock market capitalization table, the country orderings seem more in line with the 
LME-CME expectations: the USA is appropriately LME for the post-war period and 
Switzerland remains on the LME side, but less so than before. 
Table 3: Ratio of Stock Market Capitalization to Bank Deposits, 
Pre-WWII and Post-WWII
High                                                                                                                                        Low
(LME)                                                                                                                                   (CME)
Pre-
WWIIa
JAP  
4.8
CAN 
4.23
UK 
3.09
FRA 
2.42
NET 
2.07
BEL 
1.98
USA 
1.73
AUS 
1.1
GER 
1.1
AUT 
1.02
ITA 
0.77
SWE 
0.64
SWI 
0.58
DEN 
0.43
NOR 
0.25
Post-
WWIIb
CAN 
2.89
UK 
2.77
USA 
1.97
JAP 
1.56
AUS 
1.4
SWI 
1.37
NET 
1.18
GER 
0.74
DEN 
0.7
NOR 
0.66
BEL 
0.61
FRA 
0.49
SWE 
0.42
ITA 
0.32
AUT 
0.2
a avg. 1913-1929vii
 b avg. 1950-1990
Data Source: Rajan and Zingales (2003).
Tables 4 and 5 show changes to these variables for the pre- and post-WWII periods. 
These tables also show the magnitude of the change in these variables, where a small 
change is expected for those countries that kept their pre-existing constitution (10 
High                                                                                                                              Low
  (LME)                                                                                                                            (CME)
Pre-
WWIIa
UK
1.24
BEL
1.15
FRA
1.04
JAP
0.85
AUT
0.76
CAN
0.74
SWI
0.58
USA
0.57
NET
0.56
AUS
0.445
SWE
0.44
GER
0.44
DEN
0.27
NOR
0.19
ITA
0.17
Post-
WWIIb
CAN
1.12
SWI
0.96
UK
0.93
AUS
0.64
JAP
0.52
USA
0.52
NET
0.42
NOR
0.29
DEN
0.23
BEL
0.23
SWE
0.21
GER
0.19
ITA
0.17
FRA
0.17
AUT
0.1
8countries), and a big change for those that changed their constitution (5 countries). Using 
the stock market capitalization measure, as in table 4, there is, on average, a smaller 
change for those countries that did not change their constitutions, when considering the 
absolute value of the change. For the actual change (not taking the absolute value), there 
is, on average, a small decrease among those countries with no change in their 
constitution; the size of the stock market increased for some of these countries in the 
post-war period while for others it decreased. But for countries in which the constitution 
changed, there is, on average, a large decrease in the size of the stock market 
capitalization.
9Table 4: Stock Market Capitalization
Pre- and Post-WWII Change
a avg. 1913-1929 
b avg. 1950-1990
c s=small change; b=big change
Table 5, which uses the preferred measure for the LME-CME orientation of the capitalist 
economy – stock market capitalization over bank deposits – likewise demonstrates a 
larger change for those countries that changed their constitutions; more than twice as 
large of a change, on average, when considering the absolute value of the difference. This 
dramatic difference is even more emphatic when accounting for the direction of the 
change. Countries without a constitutional change tended to change towards banks or 
markets nearly evenly, while those with constitutional changes all moved toward a 
greater reliance on banks in truly dramatic fashion.
AUS AUT BEL CAN DEN FRA GER ITA JAP NET NOR SWE SWI UK USA
Pre-WWIIa 0.445 0.76 1.15 0.74 0.27 1.04 0.44 0.17 0.85 0.56 0.19 0.44 0.58 1.24 0.57
Post-WWIIb 0.64 0.097 0.23 1.12 0.23 0.17 0.19 0.17 0.52 0.42 0.29 0.21 0.96 0.93 0.52
Absolute 
difference
0.195 0.66 0.91 0.38 0.03 0.87 0.25 0.004 0.32 0.13 0.104 0.23 0.38 0.31 0.05
Difference 0.195 -0.66 -0.91 0.38 -0.03 -0.87 -0.25 -0.004 -0.32 -0.13 0.104 -0.23 0.38 -0.31 -0.05
Expectationc s b s s s b b b b s s s s s s
Small change 
expected
0.27Average
change of the 
absolute 
difference Big change 
expected
0.42
Small change 
expected
-0.06
Average
change of the 
difference Big change 
expected
-0.42
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Table 5: Stock Market Capitalization over Bank Deposits
Pre- and Post-WWII Change
AUS AUT BEL CAN DEN FRA GER ITA JAP NET NOR SWE SWI UK USA
Pre-WWII
m/ba
1.1 1.02 1.98 4.23 0.43 2.42 1.1 0.77 4.8 2.07 0.25 0.64 0.58 3.09 1.73
Post-WWII
m/bb
1.4 0.2 0.61 2.89 0.7 0.49 0.74 0.32 1.56 1.18 0.66 0.42 1.37 2.77 1.97
Absolute 
difference
0.36 0.78 1.38 1.33 0.27 1.93 0.36 0.45 3.27 0.89 0.41 0.22 0.79 0.32 0.24
Difference 0.36 -0.78 -1.38 -1.3 0.26 -1.93 -0.36 -0.45 -3.26 -0.89 0.41 -0.22 0.79 -0.32 0.24
Expectation s b s s s b b b b s s s s s s
Small change 
expected
0.62Average
change of the
absolute 
difference Big change 
expected
1.36
Small change 
expected
-0.2Average
change of the
difference Big change 
expected -1.36
a m/b = market capitalization over bank deposits. The average is taken for 1913 and 1929 
b average of 1950, 1960, 1970, 1980, and 1990.
The box plots in figures 1 and 2 demonstrate that the reliance on markets in the 
post-WWII period differed markedly depending on whether a country’s constitution 
changed after the war. For both measures, the reliance on markets is less than half that of 
those countries whose constitutions did not change. Table 6 details the numerical values 
for each box plot.
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Figure 1: Box Plot of Market Capitalization over GDP During the Post-WWII 
Period for Countries without and with Constitutional Change after WWII
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Note: 0 and 1 correspond to no constitutional change and to constitutional change, 
respectively.
Figure 2: Box Plot of Market Capitalization over Bank Deposits for the Post-WWII 
Period for Countries without and with Constitutional Change after WWII
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Table 6: Description of the Box Plots
Market Capitalization over GDP, 
Post-WWII
Market Capitalization over Bank 
Deposits, Post-WWII
Constitutional 
Change after 
1945?
No Yes No Yes
Median 0.473 0.17 1.275 0.49
Minimum 
value
0.212 0.097 0.42 0.24
Maximum 
value
1.118 0.522 2.9 1.56
25% value 0.2375 0.16 0.66 0.32
75% value 0.93 0.19 1.97 0.74
Mean 0.5575 0.229 1.4 0.67
N 10 5 10 5
How do we appropriately assess the impact of partisanship on these dramatic and long-
lasting changes to nations’ economic institutions? 
IV) Measuring Partisanship 
Partisanship is generally regarded as influential to each of the variables discussed above. 
The more left wing the government is, the more coordinated the economy tends to be 
(more CME than LME), the smaller the stock market tends to be relative to banks, the
more concentrated ownership tends to be, and the more government intervention in the 
economy that occurs.
To measure government partisanship, I use an indicator from Franzese (2002), 
which takes the average ideological value assigned to political parties by multiple expert 
studies.viii This ideological value, normalized to between 0 and 10, where 10 is the most 
right-wing (I invert it so that 10 I the most left-wing), is then weighted according to the 
number of cabinet posts held by each party. To extend Franzese’s measure prior to 
13
WWII, I use Dodd’s (1976) ideological placement of political parties during the interwar 
period. I normalize his score so that it corresponds to the 0 – 10 scale. Data on the 
partisan composition of government is obtained with Mackie and Rose’s (1990) and 
Flora’s (1987) data which, respectively, provide the proportion of seats in parliament held 
by each political party as well as the coalition parties forming a government, if a coalition 
occurred. Based on observation of such coalitions in the postwar period and coalitions in 
the interwar period where data are available (e.g., Australia), cabinet seats are generally 
assigned to parties according to the proportion of seats the coalition partner holds as a 
percentage of total coalition seats. Thus, based on the proportion of parliamentary seats 
each coalition party holds, we can determine the percentage of cabinet seats the party 
held, and then calculate the average partisan score for each government so that it 
corresponds to Franzese’s measure. These data are available across countries for 1929, 
which offers a useful indicator for countries’ partisanship levels; indeed, many of the key 
bargains over the structure of modern capitalist institutions were struck during this 
interwar period. Left-wing power before WWI (in 1913) can be determined only 
approximately by using the proportion of parliamentary seats held by left-wing political 
parties. This lacks a measure for ideological position, but it is clear that left-wing parties 
were far weaker at this time than in the interwar years, which is consistent with financial 
indicators for this period, such as the size of stock markets being relatively larger (Rajan 
and Zingales, 2003), and with qualitative assessments of states’ general levels of 
economic intervention being quite low. Table 7 presents the numerical values for this 
partisanship measure: Partisanship at the Origins of Capitalist Institutions (POCI). This 
variable measures government partisanship for 10 countries in 1929, and is updated to 
14
1950 for the 5 countries whose constitutions, and broader economic institutions, changed 
after WWII.
Table 7: Partisanship at the Origins of Capitalist Institutions (POCI)
 POCI
AUS 3.5
AUT 4.8
BEL 4.7
CAN 2.8
DEN 6.4
FRA 5.7
GER 4
ITA 4.9
JAP 1.35
NET 4.3
NOR 7
SWE 6.3
SWI 3.9
UK 2
USA 3.3
V) Tests
I test for correlations between the economic variables of interest - coordination index, 
stock market capitalization, stock market capitalization relative to bank deposits, 
diffusion of corporate ownership, and government intervention - and the level of 
partisanship at the time capitalist institutions were created (the POCI variable). I compare 
the results of the POCI measure to two alternative partisanship measures: one which 
measures partisanship in 1950 to account for the possibility of new bargains being struck 
after the war, and a second a partisanship measure which is determined by taking 
countries’ average level of partisanship during the post-WWII period.
15
I first test for correlations with respect to the coordination index developed by 
Hall and Gingerich (2004) since it provides a general measure for the level of 
institutional complementarity for nations’ political economies. The main drawback of this 
measure is that it is a static measure for the post-WWII period alone, and is calculated 
with data for the 1990s only. Although Hall and Soskice (2001) argue that 
complementary institutions would constrain change across the post-WWII period, it 
would be useful to have a measure that averaged the variables that comprise this index 
across the entire period. Nevertheless, the tests illustrate that the POCI variable is the 
only partisanship variable to display statistically significant results. It is likely surprising 
to many readers that the post-WWII average partisanship variable does not return 
statistically significant results, but this result reinforces the importance of being sensitive 
to the initial bargains over institutional design to subsequent outcomes.
Table 8: POCI and Institutional Coordination 
a calculated from the partisanship levels at decade intervals from 1950 to 1990.
*** statistical significance at the 1% level; ** statistical significance at the 5% 
level.
Note: t-statistics in parentheses.
DV: Coordination Index
Japan 
Excluded
POCI 
0.09**
(2.13)
0.15***
(3.16)
Post-WWII 
Average 
Partisanshipa
0.09
(1.38)
Partisanship 
1950
-0.002
(-0.04)
Adjusted R2 0.2 0.06 -0.07 0.41
N 15 15 15 14
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The scatterplot in figure 3 shows that Japan is a clear outlier. However, its 
placement at such a far right-wing extreme is problematic since the left exercised 
considerable bargaining power in the years immediately after the war, when bargains 
over capitalist institutions were struck (Garon, 1987; Gilson and Roe, 1999). That Japan 
is too far left is a result of the partisanship variable being measured in 1950, immediately 
after the bargains were largely concluded. 
Figure 3: POCI and Institutional Coordination
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Post-WWII Japan
The Japanese labor movement surged immediately after WWII ended. In December 
1945, 380,000 workers were members of labor unions, swelling to 900,000 in January 
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1946. The prewar Sodomei, or Japan Confederation of Trade Unions, was revived by 
social democrats and other moderate left-wing organizers in August 1946, and soon 
numbered 855,000 members. In late August, Communist activists organized the Congress 
of Industrial Organizations (Sanbetsu Kaigi), which had 1,630,000 members.  Another 
national organization, the Japan Congress of Trade Unions (Nichiro Kaigi), and a number 
of independent enterprise-wide federations of local labor unions in large multi-plant 
companies such as the steelmaker Japan Steel Tube (Nippon Kokan, or NKK Corp.) were 
established as well. 
Nosaka Sanzo, a leading Communist, published “An Appeal to the Japanese 
People” which served as the basis for the Emancipation League (formerly the Anti-War 
League), founded in 1944. The League’s program was couched in moderate language so 
as to appeal to a wide audience, but among its key policy prescriptions, it advocated 
“maintaining and strengthening state control over banks” (Colbert, 1952: 64). The 
program served as the ideological basis for a large segment of the postwar labor 
movement. The more moderate Socialists, in 1946, proposed a system of state control of 
key industries (Colbert, 1952: 88), as well as the establishment of a Supreme Economic 
Council to determine general economic policies, subsidiary councils for each industry, 
and at each level of planning or supervision trade-union representatives, as well as 
representatives of business and government, would participate. The long-term financial 
program of the Socialist Party called for the socialization of all banks and insurance 
companies, entailing the establishment of a Banking Control Committee to be headed by 
the Finance Minister and to be responsible for the utilization of funds. Additionally, it 
proposed that half of each bank’s managers would be selected from among its employees 
18
(Colbert, 1952: 90). The resemblance to France’s postwar Socialist Party policies is 
striking (Kuisel, 1981).
At first, American General Headquarters (GHQ) actively promoted labor unions, 
but as the Cold War began and the communist threat increased, GHQ modified its 
policies. After ordering the cancellation of the General Strike on February 1, 1947, 
General MacArthur directed Prime Minister Yoshida to hold a general election in April in 
order to alleviate social unrest. The Japan Socialist Party’s (JSP) subsequent election 
victory brought Japan’s first Socialist government to power (Koshiro, 2000); they won a 
plurality of seats, but the right-wing combination of Liberal and Democratic Parties 
prevented any effective left-wing legislation from being passed. GHQ became 
increasingly worried about the rise of communism and the growing strength of labor, so 
as of July 1948, national civil servants were deprived of the right to strike via a change in 
the National Civil Service Law. 
The election on January 24, 1949 shattered the Socialist Party, whose seats fell 
from 143 to 48 in the Lower House, while the Communist Party was strengthened, 
winning 35 seats and nearly 10 percent of the vote. The overall result, however, was a 
swing to the right and Yoshida became premier of the new post-election government. 
Yoshida now moved the anti-union struggle into high gear. This took two forms: (1) 
extensive subversion of left-wing unions from within, via ‘democratization leagues’ or 
mindō; and (2) an ‘anti-inflationary’ policy, one of whose chief features was wholesale 
dismissal of militant workers. 
The implementation of the Dodge Plan led to firings and layoffs on a large scale, 
causing the elimination of a large sector of the militant left, and to the reorganization and 
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strengthening of oligopoly capital. Although the Dodge program involved expanding big 
industry and therefore employment in big industry, the reorganization was used carefully 
to weed out militant workers and to weaken the union movement. In 1949 alone, 435,465 
workers were dismissed from their jobs, and around 300,000 more in 1950. In the same 
period, the number of unions declined by over 5,500 and union membership fell by 
880,000. The government purges were accompanied by direct promotion of the anti-
communist mindō (Halliday, 1978: 217-20). 
As the old workers union (Sanbetsu) and the left were gravely weakened, the 
Yoshida government, the Employers’ Federation (Nikkeiren) and GHQ worked towards a 
new union coalition based largely on the mindō. The new federation, Sōhyō, was founded 
in July 1950, immediately after the purge of the Japan Communist Party and the start of 
the Korean War. As the head of Sōhyō wrote in 1965: “the history of the foundation of 
Sōhyō is closely connected with the fight against the domination of the Japanese trade 
unions by the Communist Party” (Halliday, 1978: 220). Just after the formation of Sōhyō, 
Sanbetsu membership dropped to 47,000 and in 1953 it went down to 13,000. The 
Federation was dissolved on February 15, 1958. Sōhyō’s domestic platform and the 
wrecking of the Sanbetsu were a big victory for business in imposing the seniority-wage 
system and intra-enterprise unions (Halliday, 1978: 220). 
To retain the loyalty of the remaining workers, managers offered them lifetime 
employment (Price, 1997: 253). Labor wanted to have influence over the form of 
corporate financing, making it long-term to suit their employment stability goals. 
However, labor was weakened, and their economic initiatives were stymied by America’s 
intervention to quell the growing communist threat. But, as Gilson and Roe (1999) assert, 
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“Because labor retained potential political influence despite the fact that managers 
recovered workplace authority in the early 1950s, the government wanted [the lifetime 
employment] bargain [forged in the wake of the labor strife of the late 1940s] to remain 
stable.” Indeed, the postwar constitution contains a ‘right to employment’ clause that 
commits government policy to full employment. And legal norms of lifetime employment 
arose through active courtroom struggles of unions against abusive dismissals of labor 
activists during the 1940s and 1950s. Japanese courts required employers to show ‘just 
cause’ for the dismissal of regular employees, since dismissals were (and are) normally 
considered an ‘abuse of right’ that shifts the burden of proof to employers. Thus, firms 
have had to exhaust alternative measures of reorganization and employment adjustment, 
thereby strengthening union involvement (Hanami, 1989). Furthermore, employment 
security has been supported by effective cross-class alliances with business to make 
political demands for state support of jobs and employment adjustment in declining 
industries (Kume, 1998). Subsequently, the government would intervene by forcing 
delegated main banks to bail out weak affiliated industrial firms (Aoki, 1994). In this 
way, lifetime employment began and endured as a political bargain, with long-term 
financing arising alongside it as a necessary component of that bargain. Thus, a more 
accurate POCI measure would correct for this course of events, however, doing so would 
lead to subjective biases; thus, I leave the Japan measure as is although the results would 
likely improve were it corrected.
Tests on Individual Institutions 
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Next, I turn to tests on individual economic institutions. First, I consider measures for the 
reliance on stock markets: the post-WWII average stock market capitalization relative to 
GDP and the post-WWII stock market capitalization relative to bank deposits.ix Both of 
these measures are tested to demonstrate robustness, although the latter is a better 
indicator for the general organization of countries’ political-economic institutions. Table 
9 shows both pre- and post-WWII correlations. While it is useful to observe the pre-
WWII correlation, as it shows the robustness of the argument across time, more 
important to contemporary outcomes is the strength of the POCI measure relative to the 
other partisanship measures for the post-WWII period.
Table 9: Partisanship Measures and Stock Market Reliance
DV: Pre-WWII Market Cap/Bank 
Deposits 
DV: Pre-WWII Market Cap 
Pre-WWII 
Partisanship 
-0.67***
(-4.41)
-0.12**
(-2.83)
Adjusted R2 0.61 0.36
N 13 13
DV: Post-WWII Market Cap/Bank 
Deposits
DV: Post-WWII Market Cap
POCI 
-0.39***
(-4.11)
-0.13***
(-3.1)
Partisanship 
1950
-0.1
(-0.73)
-0.04
(-0.8)
Post-WWII 
Average 
Partisanship
-0.43**
(-2.8)
-0.14**
(-2.14)
Adjusted R2 0.53 -0.3 0.32 0.38 -0.02 0.2
N 15 15 15 15 15 15
*** statistical significance at the 1% level; ** statistical significance at the 5% level.
Note: t-statistics in parentheses.
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Table 10 illustrates the robustness of the POCI variable when controlling for legal family: 
common or civil law (La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer, and Vishny, 1998). The pre-
WWII tests are particularly illuminating since they demonstrate no statistically significant 
correlation to the legal family variable (which is very heavily cited in economics 
journals), while the partisan variable remains statistically significant across both periods. 
This evidence offers support for critiques of the legal family argument, which charge that 
it fails to account for the underlying political mechanisms that legal structures arise from, 
and are conditioned by.
Table 10: POCI and Stock Market Reliance
DV: Pre-
WWII 
Market/Bank
DV: Pre-
WWII 
Market Cap 
DV: Post-WWII 
Market Cap/Bank 
Deposits
DV: Post-
WWII 
Market Cap
Pre-WWII 
Partisanship 
-0.69***
(-3.86)
-0.13**
(-2.76)
POCI 
-0.22***
(-2.78)
-0.08*
(-1.8)
Common Law -0.1
(-0.16)
-0.11
(-0.64)
1.08***
(3.78)
0.32*
(1.98)
Adjusted R2 0.56 0.33 0.77 0.49
N 13 13 15 15
*** statistical significance at the 1% level; ** statistical significance at the 5% level.
Note: t-statistics in parentheses.
The concentration of corporate ownership is often viewed as another important 
indicator corresponding to the general structure of capitalist systems, with coordinated 
market economies exhibiting more concentrated ownership than liberal market 
economies. I look at three measures for ownership concentration: (1) the commonly used 
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measure of widely held ownership; (2) a concentrated ownership measure that combines 
the extent of family and state ownership; and (3) an aggregate diffuse ownership measure 
which combines the widely held measure with ownership by widely held financial 
corporations and widely held nonfinancial corporations. Data on these indicators come 
from La Porta et al (1999). Most analyses focus on the first only, but I test the additional 
indicators to assess whether partisanship exhibits correlations to general corporate 
ownership outcomes. I expect a negative relationship for the first corporate ownership 
measure (widely held top 10), a positive correlation for the second (family and state 
ownership top 10), and a negative correlation for the third (diffuse ownership aggregated 
top 10). Table 11 again reveals stronger correlations for the POCI variable compared to 
the alternative partisanship measures, and table 12 demonstrates the robustness of this 
relationship to the inclusion of control variables. The proportional representation variable 
(PR) is included to account for Pagano and Volpin’s (2001) argument that coalition 
governments offer more groups the capacity to prevent changes to the status quo -
concentrated ownership.
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Table 11: Partisanship Measures and Corporate Ownership
Widely Held Top 10a
Family and State Own. Top 
10b
Diffuse Own. Aggregated Top 
10c
POCI 
-0.14***
(-4.66)
0.12***
(4.18)
-0.12***
(-3.38)
Post-WWII 
Average 
Partisanship
-0.14***
(-4.02)
0.14***
(3.9)
-0.12**
(-2.23)
Partisanship 
1950
-0.07
(-1.67)
0.05
(1.41)
-0.02
(-0.57)
Adjusted R2 0.60 0.34 0.11 0.54 0.5 0.06 0.43 0.22 -0.05
N 15 15 15 15 15 15 15 15 15
a Top 10 refers to a sample of the 20 largest firms with 10% as the cut off for control, as 
measured by La Porta et al (1999).
b Family and state ownership = family ownership + state ownership. 
c Diffuse ownership aggregated= widely held + widely held financial corporations + 
widely held nonfinancial corporations.
*** statistical significance at the 1% level; ** statistical significance at the 5% level.
Note: t-statistics in parentheses.
Table 12: POCI and Corporate Ownership I
Widely 
Held Top 
10
Family and 
State Own. 
Top 10
Diffuse Own. 
Aggregated 
Top 10
POCI 
-0.099***
(-3.54)
0.09***
(3.07)
-0.07**
(2.59)
Common 
Law
0.1
(0.61)
0.03
(0.17)
-0.001
(-0.01)
PR
-0.19
(-1.3)
0.2
(1.27)
-0.35**
(-2.26)
Adjusted R2 0.76 0.6 0.72
N 15 15 15
*** statistical significance at the 1% level; ** statistical significance at the 5% level.
Note: t-statistics in parentheses.
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Indeed, government partisanship at the time when capitalist institutions were created 
explains a greater amount of variation in the widely held measure (60%) than other 
widely cited contemporary partisanship measures (e.g., Roe, 2003, with an adjusted R-
squared value equal to 45%). Weaker results are observed with respect to medium-sized 
firms, as shown in table 13. This may be due to actors’ greater attention to rules affecting 
the largest firms, which are more likely to have been important to, and present during, the 
initial bargains.
Table 13: POCI and Corporate Ownership II
Widely 
Held 
Top 20a
Family & 
State 
Own. 
Top 20 a
Diffuse 
Own. 
Agg. Top 
20 a
Widely 
Held 
Med 
10b
Family & 
State 
Own. 
Med 10 b
Diffuse 
Own. 
Agg. 
Med 10 b
Widely 
Held 
Med 
20c
Family 
& State 
Own. 
Med 20 c
Diffuse 
Own. 
Agg. 
Med 20 c
POCI
-0.1***
(-2.88)
0.08***
(2.95)
-0.09***
(-2.9)
-0.02
(-0.89)
0.08*
(1.94)
-0.02
(-0.64)
-0.02
(-0.61)
0.08**
(2.18)
-0.01
(-0.61)
Common 
Law
-0.14
(-0.62)
0.03
(0.2)
-0.05
(-0.27)
0.2
(1.09)
0.03
(0.15)
0.12
(0.64)
0.53**
(2.29)
-0.1
(-0.4)
0.39*
(1.96)
PR
-0.35
(-1.73)
0.19
(1.2)
-0.29
(-1.67)
0.08
(0.54)
-0.009
(-0.04)
-0.02
(-0.18)
0.15
(0.8)
-0.03
(-0.17)
0.03
(0.18)
Adjusted 
R2
0.57 0.57 0.63 0.14 0.11 0.11 0.5 0.3 0.53
N 15 15 15 15 15 15 15 15 15
a corporate ownership for a sample of the 20 largest companies with 20% share 
ownership as the cutoff for blockholding.
b corporate ownership for a sample of companies worth more than $500 million with 10% 
share ownership as the cutoff for blockholding.
c corporate ownership for a sample of companies worth more than $500 million with 20% 
share ownership as the cutoff for blockholding.
*** statistical significance at the 1% level; ** statistical significance at the 5% level; * 
statistical significance at the 10% level.
Note: t-statistics in parentheses.
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The extent of government intervention is tested next. In this context, an economy with 
higher levels of intervention is generally equated with exhibiting stronger features of a 
coordinated market economy. Intervention is tested with a measure constructed by 
Nicoletti et al. (1999: 74) and is described as capturing “public ownership” (in turn taking 
into account the “size” and “scope” of the public sector, “control of public enterprises by 
legislative bodies,” and “special voting rights”) and “(state) involvement in business 
operations” (in turn including “price controls” and “use of command and control 
regulations”). The control variable, state centralization, is from Verdier (2003).x
Table14: POCI and State Control
*** statistical significance at the 1% level; ** statistical significance at the 5% level.
Note: t-statistics in parentheses.
Again, the POCI variable demonstrates stronger correlations to the dependent variable 
than the alternative partisanship measures.
DV: State Control 
POCI 
0.38***
(3.24)
0.23***
(2.77)
Post-WWII 
Average 
Partisanship
0.37*
(1.96)
Partisanship 
1950
0.1
(0.99)
State 
Centralization
0.69
(0.97)
Common 
Law
-0.83**
(2.71)
Adjusted R2 0.4 0.17 0.00 0.56
N 15 15 15 15
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VI) Conclusions
The results illustrate the importance of looking at bargains that may have been negotiated
many decades prior to an institution’s contemporary manifestation. Moreover, cross-
section time-series tests that analyze contemporaneous levels and changes to partisanship 
miss the more fundamental circumstances that contribute to the structure of an economic 
institution – the nature of the bargains when it was created. The tests here focus on those 
attributes of capitalist systems viewed as useful indicators for a nation’s overall political 
economy. In view of the robustness of the results for the POCI variable, it would likely 
be worthwhile reexamining other economic outcomes that correlate with government 
partisanship.
In addition to implications for understanding the origins of wealthy economies’ 
contemporary institutions, it is useful to keep in mind the importance of the political 
bargains struck over developing countries’ institutions. For those countries presently 
negotiating the structure of their institutions, the evidence here suggests that the nature of 
bargains struck today could have decades-long consequences.
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i Germany and Austria changed their constitutions markedly after WWI as well. Austria 
reinstated its 1920 constitution after WWII (along with the 1929 revisions to the 
president’s powers) after it was replaced by an Austrofascist constitution of 1934.
ii Some of these were reimplemented from the interwar period, but because these interwar 
bargains were so short-lived, there was insufficient time for these practices to become 
properly institutionalized.
iii For this reason, I exclude data for 1938 and 1999 from the analysis.
iv Each variable is multiplied by 100 before taking the ratio to avoid mathematical 
problems that occur with dividing numbers less than one.
v  Unless change of gov. after WWI, then 1913 only; includes Austria, Germany, and 
Italy.
vi Bank deposits data are from Rajan and Zingales, 2003. For data in the post-WWII 
period, bank deposits exhibit greater than 95% correlation to bank lending (data for bank 
assets are from Beck, Levine, and Demirguc-Kunt, 2001).
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vii Unless change of gov. after WWI, then 1913 only; includes Austria, Germany, and 
Italy.
viii The expert studies include Laver and Hunt (1992), Laver and Schofield (1990), Dodd 
(1976), Castles and Mair (1984), Laver and Budge (1992), Sani and Sartori (1983), 
Morgan (1976), Inglehardt and Klingemann (1987), Mavgordatos (1984), Bruneau and 
MacCleod (1986), Blair (1984), Kerr (1987), Taylor and Laver (1973), Browne and 
Dreijmanis (1982), and de Swaan (1973). Multiple expert studies are used to minimize 
the bias/subjectivity caused by relying on only one or a couple.
ix Both variables are with respect to GDP, which drops out when taking the ratio of them.
x To extend his centralization measure across countries and time, I supplement it with
data from Flora (1983). 
